T1557.501 Radio Interface

Description: An adversary positions itself on the radio interface to capture information to and from UE that is bid down to less secure format.

Adversary can deploy a fake gNB or WiFi access point, or a back-to-back fake gNB-UE combination to act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept and possibly modify communication and relay communication to and from intended recipient over the air interface.

This attack assumes the following to have taken place: the UE security profile allows bidding down to an earlier generation, adversary denies service to 5G, bids down victim UE to less secure protocol with illegitimate signaling, orders the UE to transmit with no or weak encryption/integrity protection.

Labelling:

* Sub-technique(s): None
* Applicable Tactics: Collection, credential-access

Metadata:

* Architecture Segment: RAN
* Platforms:
* Access Type Required: None
* Data Sources:
* Theoretical/Proof of Concept/Observed: Observed

Procedure Examples:

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| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Description** |
| Adversary-in-the-Middle on air interface for a given UE | The adversary employs a back to back gNB-UE combination. When UE security profile allows bidding down, adversary denies service to 5G, bids down victim UE to less secure protocol with illegitimate signaling, acts as a adversary-in-the-middle to intercept and possibly modify communication, and relays communication to and from intended recipient. |
| Adversary-in-the-Middle on air interface for any UE | Alternatively, if the 5G system employs null integrity or encryption, subscriber data traffic can be eavesdropped or modified in transit over the air interface |
| Adversary uses a fake base station to broadcast spoofed configuration messages to UEs nearby | Reference [3] (appendix B) contains a taxonomy of attacks against 5G UEs, passive and active. One concerns message attacks (fake MIB/SIB – Master Information Block/System Information Block) |

Mitigations

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| **ID** | **Use** |
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Pre-Conditions

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| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Description** |
| Permissive subscriber security profile OR system employs null integrity or encryption. | Subscriber security profile must allow bidding down to less secure service OR system must employ null integrity or encryption. |

Critical Assets

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| **Name** | **Description** |
| Subscriber signaling | All signaling transmitted to and from subscriber can be intercepted in the clear |
| UE location | UE/subscriber geographical location can be intercepted. |
| Subscriber traffic | All data and voice transmitted to and from subscriber can be intercepted in the clear |

Detection

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| **ID** | **Detects** |
| FGDS5012 | UE measurements of received power levels from all base stations nearby, and their identifiers Reference clause 6.24 of [3] |

Post-Conditions

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| **Name** | **Description** |
| Temporary loss of subscriber data confidentiality or integrity. | Transient technique. Works only as long as adversary-in-the-middle is able to retain connection. |

References

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| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **URL** |
| European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA): “ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks” Report, section 4.4, December 2020. | https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-for-5g-networks |
| Hu, X. et al: “A Systematic Analysis Method for 5G Non-Access Stratum Signalling Security”, August 2019 | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8817957 |
| 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) TR 33.809: “Study on 5G security enhancements against False Base Stations (FBS)”, Technical Report, v0.18.0, February 2022. | https://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33809.htm |